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A Medical Anthropology of the “Global Psyche”
A medical anthropology of the “global psyche” may sound like an odd project. Is
there one psyche that pervades the whole globe? In their introduction to this special
issue, Dominique Be´hague and Kenneth MacLeish dissuade any suggestion of either
the global or the psyche as entities that could be examined like substances. Neither
the psyche nor the globe are stable points of reference. They are not names of entities.
Instead, the global psyche is “a concept, era, program, and episteme that rewards
careful analysis” (this issue). There are “multitudinous labors” and “novel forces—
political, technological, neurobiological, ecological” that are redefining what either
the global or the psyche could be.
For anthropology to describe the psyche as global, it needs to theorize what the
psyche is and how it connects to its outside and to other psyches. But we struggle to
do this; our conceptual language hardly allows it. There have been recent attempts
in the social sciences at grasping psyche beyond individual brains. Elliott (2011)
goes back to J. G. Herder’s notion of “mood” (Stimmung) as both affect and
environment. Cvetkovich (2012) gestures at depression as a “public feeling.” Rosa
(2016) theorizes mental illness as a disturbed “resonance” between individuals and
the world.
The global psyche used to be a key idea in philosophy. In Greek thought, the
universe was a living body with a single world psuche (ψυχη´, as “soul,” “vital
breath,” or “life”) extending through it. This global psyche maintained the shape of
the cosmos by separating chaos from form. Plato’s Timaeus describes the universe
as a “Living Creature which is designed to embrace within itself all living creatures”
(Plato 1952, 33). The shape of this living All is the sphere, “which of all shapes
is the most perfect and the most self-similar” (p. 33). This cosmic being is “one
visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature”
(p. 30). At its center, and “diffused throughout” (p. 33), is the global psyche. The
psyche is “the best of things created” because it is composed of everlasting essence
and “partakes of reason and harmony” (p. 37). The cosmic psyche is “global” as
“reaching everywhere” and “being shaped like a rounded sphere.”
The idea of a global psyche now feels like a premodern phantasy. To think of the
world as if it was a maximally scaled-up cosmic animal seems madly unscientific.
Gaston Bachelard (1967 [1934], 5) would have classed this “naive realism of spatial
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properties” as another example of an epistemic obstacle that scientific objectivity
needed to overcome. Since the 17th century, scientists started describing the psyche
as an emergent state located in individual human anatomies, specifically in that
spherical mass of neural cells and blood vessels called the brain (Zimmer 2005).
The brain became a closed system of nervous excitation that responds to sensory
input only on its own terms. A psyche pervading matter beyond the individual body
became an absurd proposition. The global psyche is now an entry in a Borgesian
encyclopedia of impossible creatures. It produces a sense of alterity, “the stark
impossibility of thinking that” (Foucault 2005 [1966], xvi). But rescuing the global
psyche from the dustbin of discarded ideas has some advantages. One of them is
that it reminds us of the historical contingency of thinking that the psyche can only
be the property of separated individual brains.
The Greek concept of a global psyche makes a surprise appearance in Ju¨rgen
Habermas’s (1971) influential Knowledge and Human Interests. Habermas dis-
cusses Plato’s global psyche as one of the foundations of the split between theory
and practice. Plato, and most philosophers up to the 19th century, argued for a
separation between perfect form on the one hand, and mutable and perishable ma-
teriality on the other. The really real is, for Plato, an abstract idea. The visible world
is merely “that which is always becoming and never is” (Timaeus, 27). Haber-
mas detects a continuity between modern scientific positivism and Greek ontology:
“both are committed to a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from
dogmatic association with the natural interests of life and their irritating influence;
and both share the cosmological intention of describing the universe theoretically in
its lawlike order, just as it is” (1971, 303). This kind of positivism also permeates
the social sciences, exemplified by the concept of value-–freedom. Social scientists
are meant to describe the grammar of social action. They should not let their own
interests cloud their analysis.
For Habermas, value–freedom is a form of pseudo-objectivity that conceals
“knowledge-constitutive interests” (1971, 308). In reality, all sciences value. Haber-
mas distinguishes three major values that motivate scientific research: understand-
ing, controlling, and emancipating. Understanding is directed toward other minds
and is built on hermeneutics. Controlling the world is founded on deductive and
empirical research. The intent to emancipate comes in a variety of forms: to make
conscious of inequalities, or to free from bonds and constraints. Critical theory aims
at emancipation. Habermas’s three types of values are mirrored in major streams of
medical anthropology: understanding is the goal of hermeneutic approaches; con-
trol is the goal of applied and policy-oriented research; and emancipation motivates
critical medical anthropology. These are the interests of the researchers. When an-
thropologists look over the shoulders of other experts, another layer of interests
emerges. Do the experts value understanding, or control, or emancipation?
Habermas’s interests help us see many connections between the contributions to
this special issue. All of the articles try to understand what drives other people’s
actions. In all the articles, these people are some kind of psy expert. These experts
either try to control the world or they seek emancipation, either for themselves or
for others. The psy sciences veer between control and emancipation: “Psychiatric
labels and discourses are employed as tools of governance in the face of violence
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and disorder but also as means of grievance and redress for social and political
movements” (Be´hague and MacLeish, this issue).
The articles most clearly focused on control—and the limits of control—are by
Margaret Lock, Junko Kitanaka, Jocelyn Chua, and Hanna Kienzler. Lock shows,
with a hefty range of medical, biological, and ecological research, how bad the
state of planetary health has become. The survival of humanity itself is at stake.
All the toxins and pollutants spread in the water, the air, and the earth refuse
to stay outside living bodies. They seep inward and destroy health on all scales.
Since the discovery of epigenetics, environmental stresses become measurable on the
genetic level. Environmental toxins become neurotoxins. Lock further argues that
socioeconomic inequality presents the “most pernicious form of toxic environment”
(this issue). She finds that the technocratic desire for control has led to a loss of
control. In its desire to make life better, technocapitalism has overreached. The
dark dialectics of science-based control are the total loss of control.
Dementia is a condition characterized by a loss of control over one’s own think-
ing, feeling, and moving. The suffering self loses control over itself, and carers lose
control over the sufferer. People become “incommensurable” to themselves and oth-
ers. Junko Kitanaka’s contribution traces current experiences of dementia in Japan.
She finds a strong shift toward a “neurobiologization” of dementia since the 2000s,
making the Japanese “engaged in a new level of neurobiological/neuropsychological
intervention in everyday life that covers the whole lifecycle” (Kitanaka, this issue).
This drive to gain control over dementia is not confined to biomedical practitioners:
Both the people living with dementia, as well as their carers, find some relief in
neuropsychiatric diagnostics and labelling. Brain scans became the foundation of
new self-understandings. Kitanaka riffs on Socrates, saying that “the unexamined
life is not worth living” (Plato, Apology, 38). In Japan, life is now “unexamined”
as long as it is unexamined by the neurosciences: “brain scans become a prerequiste
for living ‘an examined life’” (Kitanaka, this issue). But all attempts at controlling
the degeneration of the brain and its functions are limited. At some point, it seems
better to “own the label” of dementia sufferer than to fight it (Kitanaka, this issue).
Jocelyn Chua also studies how attempts at control get frustrated. Her ethnogra-
phy of the U.S. military’s changing positions toward soldiers’ psychopharmaceutical
consumption shows that so-called total institutions struggle to exert control, both
over what goes on within them and what goes on beyond their boundaries. The
U.S. military wants to control what kind of psychotropic substances their troops
are taking. Ideally, all troops would be in excellent mental condition, without any
of the “vices of civilians and civilian culture: mental weakness, intolerance to pain
and suffering, self-indulgence, and desires for immediate gratification” (Chua, this
issue). However, the military has to acknowledge that a large number of soldiers
get medicated in the civilian sector and carry these medications with them into the
military; that soldiers get (over)medicated by army doctors who are not meant to do
this; or that soldiers obtain psychotropics through informal market exchanges with
other soldiers. “Pharmaceutical creep” happens through many vectors, and Chua
chronicles changing attempts by the military to keep the creep at bay. The seepage
of substances is motivated by a desire to enhance battle fitness. Ironically, both
the top brass of the military and the individual soldiers pursue the same value: to
enhance combat fitness through controlled medication use. Luis, one of the soldiers
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quoted by Chua, explains how his sergeant is supplying him with regular doses of
the stimulant Adderall. The transaction breaks the rules, but the sergeant is doing
this to augment combat fitness. Luis agrees that his superior is “saving my life with
these drugs” (this issue).
While Chua studies the psyche in active military service, Hanna Kienzler looks at
post-conflict psychotherapies for civilians. The psy-scientific logic of “Global Men-
tal Health” looks deceptively simple: conflict creates psychological problems. These
problems are perfectly described by standard diagnostics and can all be treated
through pharmacological and nonpharmacological interventions. Interventions de-
veloped by Euro American psy sciences are ready to be “scaled up” across the globe.
Anyone’s psyche can be brought back under control. However, as Kienzler shows
in her ethnography of different psychotherapeutic practitioners in the Kosovo, there
are limits to this logic. Psychosocial interventions cannot be scaled up quite so easily
in a place without solid infrastructures in medicine and social welfare. Kienzler’s
Kosovar therapists get stuck in a double bind: On the one hand, they are meant to
treat their patients; on the other, they realize that patients’ living conditions are so
troubled as to render simple intervention useless. The therapists try to regain con-
trol by reducing all problems to some kind of conflict-related psychological trauma.
This reduction allows them to resort to “handing out of placebos, giving more or
less helpful life advice, and referring women to often dysfunctional social services
(Kienzler, this issue).
How a refusal of control can become an act of emancipation is the topic of
Cristiana Giordano’s study of asylum seekers in the south of Italy. The refugee
situation is the confluence of multiple crises. There are military and economic crises
in the countries where the asylum seekers are from. In turn, the influx of immigrants
presents a crisis to the countries where they arrive. Due to its long Mediterranean
coast and proximity toNorth Africa and theMiddle East, Italy is one of the countries
that receives a huge number of asylum seekers. These crises are all forms of losing
control. The usual response to these crises is an attempt to regain control. Giordano
finds that there is another way of dealing with the crises: a refusal to acknowledge
them. Giordano tells the story of an asylum seeker called Victor, who refuses to
make drawings of his “refugee experience.” The reasons for Victor’s refusal never
become transparent: he “prefers not to.” Victor reminds Giordano of Melville’s
character Bartleby the scribe, who vexes everyone by gently refusing to do what he
is meant to do. Victor does not rewrite the grammar of crisis, but he interrupts it for
a short moment. Not acknowledging the crisis is (perhaps) an act of emancipation.
The quest for emancipation is clearest in Sean Brotherton’s contribution on
Lacanian psychoanalysis in Argentina. This South American country is, in his de-
scription, an exemplar of chronic political and economic crises. Brotherton’s inter-
locutors seek solace from the crises in psychoanalysis. Freudian psychoanalysis has
deep roots in Argentina. The Lacanian version has been gaining traction since the
1970s, perhaps because it intersects with Marxian theory and lends itself better to
a critical analysis than Freudianism (Stavrakakis 2002). However, psychoanalysis
on its own is ill-suited to grasp sociopolitical crises. Further, the costly fees preserve
psychoanalysis as a practice by an economic elite for an economic elite. And yet,
Brotherton’s Argentinian interlocutors find in it a language of emancipation. La-
canian analysis provides a “grammar” that allows people to articulate their suffering
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and their “desire to live a better life” (Brotherton, this issue). Brotherton shows that
psychoanalysis has the same duality of control and emancipation that also appears
in biomedical psychiatry: It purports to make the inner self “legible” and amenable
to intervention, and at the same time it wants to give insight, relief, and eman-
cipation. Yet, just like in biopsychiatry, the emancipation remains apolitical: The
“self-knowledge” (autoconocimiento) gained through Lacanian analysis is confined
to helping the inner psyche respond in a more relaxed way to outside crises.
All the articles speak to the global dissemination of psy-science expertise. Di-
agnoses such as dementia, depression, or post-traumatic stress have traveled the
globe. Treatments, both pharmacological and nonpharmacological, are available
in all parts of the world. Diagnoses and treatments have been cut loose from the
control of the psy sciences (Ecks 2013). In turn, there is a global connection between
different causes of mental suffering. War, violence, economic breakdown, and envi-
ronmental destruction have all reached global proportions. Regaining control over
this situation seems impossible. The psyche cannot find an easy path to emancipa-
tion because there is no sane outside to turn to. Habermas picked on Plato’s global
psyche as a forerunner of value-free positivism in the sciences. But there is another
side to Plato’s idea, which is that it questions the psy sciences’ individualization
and materialist reductionism. The Greek notion of a global psyche was an epistemic
obstacle to technoscientific overreach—but not obstacle enough.
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